Performativity

The readings for tomorrow's class focus on "performativity," or use of language to perform actions. In the characteristic manner of philosophy writings, the essays by Searle and Austin quickly become complicated and dense. The cumulative impact of these readings on me was a newfound awareness and appreciation for the complexities of interpersonal communication. Each time an individual utters a sentence, this action is prone to analysis on several different levels. We can talk about the intention of the speaker, the propositional content, the function indicated by the sentence structure, whether the circumstances surrounding the utterance are "felicitous," and how/whether the statement projects the speaker's identity.

I don't think I'm very good at intensively analyzing philosophical essays. Austin succeeded in convincing me of the existence of performative utterances, and I followed him and agreed with him throughout his discussion. I was surprised at the end when he brought statements under the category of performative utterances.

I don't know what to think about the role of intention in speech acts. It seems to me that much communication is unintentional or misinterpreted or insincere. If you talk to yourself or to a friend and are overheard, you have communicated something to an unintended audience. If your cell phone breaks up and your friend hears "buy the tickets now," instead of "DON'T buy the tickets now," this would seem to affect matters. Austin talked about "infelicities," and I suppose these instances would fall under the "infelicitous" category. Is there more we can say about intercepted or interrupted communication? I hardly know, but I will give the matter some more thought.

The most interesting part of the Searle excerpt was the discussion of the intentional and conventional aspects of the illocutionary act. This was in the section on "meaning" (44-46). What sets apart a speech act from a series of sounds or shapes is that one "means something" by those sounds or scribbles. We say that those words or letters "have meaning." What is boggling is that verbal communication is wrapped up in the participants as much as in the word-symbols. The speaker wants the listener to recognize that it is his intention to communicate a certain meaning. The words and inflection and timing etc. that the speaker chooses are determined by convention, which includes the rules of grammar and etiquette. At least, I think that's what Searle says.

In the Hall article, what stood out to me was the mention of Michelle Rosaldo, whose work we are reading next week. I am curious to see what she has to say after the preview given in the Hall article. According to Hall, Rosaldo argues that Austin and Searle's emphasis on intention and sincerity is ethnocentric. Across cultures, the speaker's psychology does not necessarily affect the success of their illocutionary acts. After reading this, I wonder what other characteristics of verbal speech vary significantly among language groups and cultures. I wonder how the characteristics of the English language and the conventions of American academic society influence our study of speech acts.

And then of course, mobile communication opens up another can of worms. How do we assess the felicity of a text message sent via mobile phone. Are people more or less inclined to be sincere when the communication is not face-to-face? Are people held more accountable when you have their promise storied in SMS or voicemail?

Just my initial thoughts, as they come.